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Abstract
Background: Avian influenza (AI) is a public health challenge because of ongoing spread and pandemic potential. 
Non-pharmaceutical measures are important to prevent the spread of AI and to contain a pandemic. The effectiveness 
of such measures is largely dependent on the behaviour of the population. Risk perception is a central element in 
changing behaviour. This study aimed to investigate perceived vulnerability, severity and precautionary behaviour 
related to AI in the Netherlands during seven consecutive surveys in 2006 - 2007 as well as possible trends in risk 
perception and self-reported precautionary behaviours.
Methods: Seven web-based surveys were conducted including 3,840 respondents over a one-year period. Time trends 
were analyzed with linear regression analyses. Multivariate analysis was used to study determinants of precautionary 
behaviour.
Results: While infection with AI was considered a very severe health problem with mean score of 4.57 (scale 1 - 5); 
perceived vulnerability was much lower, with a mean score of 1.69. While perceived severity remained high, perceived 
vulnerability decreased slightly during a one-year period covering part of 2006 and 2007. Almost half of the 
respondents (46%) reported taking one or more preventive measures, with 36% reporting to have stayed away from 
(wild) birds or poultry. In multivariate logistic regression analysis the following factors were significantly associated with 
taking preventive measures: time of the survey, higher age, lower level of education, non-Dutch ethnicity, vaccinated 
against influenza, higher perceived severity, higher perceived vulnerability, higher self efficacy, lower level of 
knowledge, more information about AI, and thinking more about AI. Self efficacy was a stronger predictor of 
precautionary behaviour for those who never or seldom think about AI (OR 2.3, 95% CI 1.9 - 2.7), compared to those 
who think about AI more often (OR 1.5, 95% CI 1.2 - 1.9).
Conclusions: The fact that perceived severity of AI appears to be high and remains so over time offers a good point of 
departure for more specific risk communications to promote precautionary actions. Such communications should aim 
at improving knowledge about the disease and preventive actions, and focus on perceived personal vulnerability and 
self efficacy in taking preventive measures.
Background
Infectious diseases are once again among the major pub-
lic health challenges. The SARS epidemic of 2003 showed
not only that there are new unknown viruses which can
have severe health consequences, but also made clear
how fast a disease can spread globally, what the societal
and economic impact can be, as well as how the media
may contribute to awareness and public concerns [1,2].
While SARS came as a surprise, since April 2009 the
world is confronted with a new influenza H1N1 pan-
demic.
Up to July 1, 2009 the World Health Organization
(WHO) has confirmed 436 human cases of avian influ-
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Page 2 of 15enza (AI) in 15 countries, mostly in South-East Asia, with
262 fatalities [3]. Outbreaks of AI among (wild) birds or
poultry have been reported in 61 countries [4]. So far,
human AI infections were limited to people who had
been in close contact with (wild) birds or poultry. None-
theless, the possibility of an adaptation of the current
H5N1 AI virus might lead to a new influenza virus which
would be easily transmitted from human-to-human and
may thus lead to a new influenza pandemic. After the
three influenza pandemics in the 20th century, the 'Span-
ish influenza' in 1918, the 'Asian influenza' in 1957 and
the 'Hong Kong influenza' in 1968 the world is now wit-
nessing a new influenza pandemic caused by the new
H1N1, which has caused 134,503 cases with 816 deaths
up to July 27, 2009 [5]. In June 2009, WHO increased the
phase of pandemic alert to 6, indicating that a global pan-
demic is under way [6].
In preparing for an influenza pandemic the develop-
ment of vaccines as well as the stockpiling of antiviral
drugs has received most attention. While developments
have been made and some countries have now a (limited)
amount of antiviral drugs, some argue that most coun-
tries fail the precautionary principle because they have
not ensured enough effective drugs [7]. Furthermore,
focusing on vaccines and antiviral drugs only will proba-
bly not be enough to limit the consequences of an influ-
enza pandemic, as these will likely neither be available in
time nor in the right quantities, and non-medical inter-
ventions will be of great importance in the control of the
epidemic [8]. The WHO has proposed a number of mea-
sures in case of an influenza pandemic: recommendations
on personal hygiene, quarantine, travel restrictions, clo-
sure of schools and other public gatherings [9,10]. A his-
torical analysis by Markel and colleagues of the reaction
to the 'Spanish influenza' in several cities in the United
States showed that cities which took earlier nonpharma-
ceutical interventions, such as school closures, public
gathering bans and isolation and quarantine, and sus-
tained these measures, had greater delays in reaching
peak mortality, lower peak mortality rates and lower total
mortality [11]. During the SARS outbreak the importance
of nonpharmaceutical interventions was also shown;
quarantine and hygiene measures helped the control of
the SARS outbreak [12].
The effectiveness of both pharmaceutical and nonphar-
maceutical interventions is largely dependent on the
behaviour of the population, i.e. compliance with the rec-
ommended preventive measures. For promotion of ade-
quate precautionary behaviour among the populations,
public health authorities need to know how people per-
ceive risks, how they perceive the effectiveness and
acceptance of nonpharmaceutical interventions and
whether they will trust and be willing and able to use the
information from public health and other authorities.
Based upon earlier outbreaks of infectious diseases, there
is only very limited information on these issues. In 2003
there was a severe outbreak of H7N7 AI in the Nether-
lands, resulting in one fatality [13]. For poultry workers,
poultry farmers and their families, specific measures
were advised such as the use of facial masks and goggles
to prevent infection, and taking anti-viral therapy. Adher-
ence to these measures was low even if people were
directly at risk for infection [14].
Risk perception is a central construct in various behav-
iour theories [15]. Risk perception has been studied
intensively in relation to environmental and technical-
industrial risk. Smith distinguishes two approaches in the
field of risk perception studies. The first is the so-called
'realistic' approach focusing on measuring the objective
risk of a specific threat or danger, which can be measured
independently from the social context [1,16,17]. Much of
the early work of Slovic, which included comparisons of
perceptions of risk, can be placed in this tradition [18-
20]. The second approach is the 'social constructionist'
approach, where the perception of risk is the result of
social and cultural processes and is shaped by these pro-
cesses (see e.g. the works of Joffe [21] and Beck [22]). In
the present study into risk perception of AI we combine a
realistic approach - since there is a real risk for human AI
and the possibility of influenza pandemic and specific
knowledge about these - with a social constructionist
approach focusing on how people perceive risks and what
actions they take.
Based upon Protection Motivation Theory we distin-
guish between the perceived severity of a disease,
described by Brewer et al. as the extent of harm a hazard
would cause, and the perceived vulnerability (often also
described as perceived likelihood or risk perception as
such), described as the probability that one will be
harmed by the hazard [15,23,24]. Additionally, compara-
tive vulnerability can be defined as the probability that
one will be harmed by the hazard compared to others of
the same age and gender. Risk perceptions are often
biased. A low comparative vulnerability, which may indi-
cate unrealistic optimism, is regularly observed towards
familiar risks that are perceived to be largely under voli-
tional control. In this optimistic bias context, people per-
ceive their comparative vulnerability compared to others
of the same sex and age as lower. The opposite, when
people perceive their comparative vulnerability to be
higher than others of the same sex and age, may indicate a
pessimistic bias, which is more likely for new risks that
are perceived as uncontrollable. The latter might be the
case with new emerging infectious diseases, like AI or an
influenza pandemic [18,25-27].
Protection Motivation Theory suggests that, apart from
risk perception, response efficacy and self efficacy are two
key determinants of precautionary behaviour. Response
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of the available protective actions, for example hygienic
measures. Self efficacy relates to a person's perception of
their ability to engage in such protective actions, e.g. that
they are able to carry out the proposed hygienic mea-
sures. Several reviews and meta-analyses focusing on the
effects of fear, risk perception and fear appeals on health
behaviours have suggested that higher risk perception
will only predict precautionary behaviour when people
believe that effective protective actions are available (in
case of sufficient response efficacy) and when they have
confidence that they have the opportunities and abilities
to engage in such protective actions (sufficient self-effi-
cacy) [28,29].
While risk perception is an important factor in many
health psychology models, there is ongoing discussion
about the (magnitude of the) effect of risk perception on
precautionary behaviours [15]. While associations
between risk perceptions and precautionary actions have
been found, they are often small. In their recent meta
analysis Brewer and colleagues showed that perceived
likelihood, susceptibility and severity were all signifi-
cantly associated with whether people got vaccinated
against influenza with the largest effect for likelihood
(pooled r = 0.26). Since most studies into risk perception
of infectious diseases do not take place during outbreaks
of infectious diseases, it is difficult to include measures of
precautionary behaviour in such research. Most of such
studies therefore focus on future behaviour or intended
behaviour in case of an outbreak [30,31]. In the present
study we were able to include self-reported precautionary
behaviour related to AI at the time of the data collection.
Since the SARS outbreak research into risk perception
of infectious diseases has gained interest. Several studies
that were conducted during the SARS outbreak and its
aftermath, indicated a relatively high level of risk percep-
tions in the United States, and relatively lower levels in
Hong Kong and the Netherlands [32-34]. Because these
studies were mostly single cross-sectional surveys, it is to
date unknown how risk perceptions evolve over time and
are affected by such issues as news coverage in the popu-
lar media or other events drawing attention to a possible
outbreak. Only a few studies have studied risk perception
related to emerging infectious diseases over a longer
period of time [35,34].
The present study explored risk perception, efficacy
beliefs and precautionary behaviour related to human AI
in seven consecutive surveys in the Netherlands. As far as
we know our study is the first with such a large sample
and consecutive surveys looking into actual self-reported
precautionary behaviour instead of reports on would-be
behaviours in case of an outbreak or other event. To
explore if risk perceptions were specific for human AI,
risk perception related to other (infectious) diseases were
also investigated. The study had the following specific
objectives:
- To study levels of perceived severity, perceived vul-
nerability and comparative vulnerability of infection
with human avian influenza and compare these with
perceptions related to other diseases and conditions
such as common cold, diabetes, HIV, high blood pres-
sure, tuberculosis, food poisoning and a heart attack.
- To explore knowledge of avian influenza, the
amount of information people had received about
avian influenza and how often they thought about it.
- To analyse correlates of risk perception of avian
influenza, and gender, age, having children below the
age of twelve, ethnicity, education, thinking about AI,
knowledge about AI, the amount of information
received and being vaccinated against influenza.
- To study precautionary behaviour related to avian
influenza and its potential determinants.
- To analyse possible trends in risk perception and
self-reported precautionary behaviours over a period
with changing risks and publicity related to possible
outbreaks.
Methods
Seven web-based surveys among random samples from
an Internet panel were conducted. At the time of data col-
lection, the panel consisted of approximately 15.000
members of whom the distribution of demographic vari-
ables (gender, age, region, and level of education) was
comparable to the Dutch adult population at large. For
each survey an independent random sample was drawn
of between 700 and 952 panel members from 18 years
and older. These panel members received an invitation to
participate by email. Each survey was online between 8
and 13 days. Panel members received 1.50 Euro in credits
for completion of a survey. When panel members have a
certain amount of credits for participating in surveys they
can exchange their credits for a gift cheque covering the
exact amount of credit. For survey studies under the
Dutch Medical Research Involving Human Subjects Act
approval of an appropriate ethics committee is not
required.
Five of the surveys were periodical with three month
intervals. The two remaining surveys were conducted
immediately after two relevant events. The first event, in
August 2006, was a suspected infection of two owls with
AI in the Rotterdam zoo. The survey in August 2006 took
place before the Department of Agriculture issued a press
release informing that no H5N1 infection had been diag-
nosed in the owls. The second event was news coverage
of an outbreak of AI at a turkey farm in the UK, which led
to new requirements to keep birds under cover in the
Netherlands in February 2007. During the full 13 month
period of serial surveys neither human cases nor infec-
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erlands.
In line with Protection Motivation Theory we devel-
oped a survey that focused on risk perception, precau-
tionary behaviour, and self and response efficacy. The
survey was based on an earlier survey used for studies
into risk perception and pandemic influenza [33]. As we
used an existing internet panel with known data on gen-
der, age, country of birth and level of education, questions
on these demographics were not included in the ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire started with additional
demographic questions concerning the country of birth
of both parents, size of the household and whether there
were children younger than 12 years in the household.
Next, a number of questions were asked about perceived
severity and susceptibility on five point answering scales.
First it was asked how serious it would be for the respon-
dent to get one of the following diseases and conditions in
the next year: diabetes, a regular cold, hiv/aids, high
blood pressure, AI, tuberculosis, a heart attack and food
poisoning. Answer possibilities ranged from very serious
to not serious at all. The next question included the same
diseases and condition and asked how likely it would be
that the respondents themselves would get the disease in
the coming years (very small chance - very large chance).
These formulations are in line with the conditioned risk
questions as discussed by Brewer and colleagues in their
recent meta-analysis of the relation between risk percep-
tion and influenza vaccination [15]. To assess compara-
tive vulnerability respondents were asked whether
compared to someone of the same age and gender in the
Netherlands they would have a smaller or larger chance
to get one of the diseases and conditions in the coming
years (a much smaller chance - a much larger chance).
The next question asked how often people thought
about AI (never - always). Self efficacy was assessed by
asking 'How sure are you that you yourself can prevent
getting AI when AI reaches the Netherlands' (not sure, -
very sure). Respondents were also asked whether they
had taken measures to prevent themselves getting
infected with AI. Possible measures included not getting
in touch with (wild) birds or poultry, not going to areas
with AI, paying more attention to hygiene, eating less or
no chicken or poultry, cancelled or didn't book a holiday
to an area with AI, getting oneself vaccinated against
influenza, avoiding shaking hands, keeping the cat
indoors, avoid gatherings of people, buying antiviral
drugs, buying a mouth mask, something else or done
nothing. We categorized these measures as measures rec-
ommended by health authorities (not getting in touch
with wild birds or poultry), non-effective measures (eat-
ing less or no chicken or poultry, getting oneself vacci-
nated against influenza) and measures which were not
recommended although they may have some preventive
effect (all the other measures). The Dutch questionnaire
is available on http://www.ggd.rotterdam.nl/Rotterdam/
Openbaar/Diensten/GGD/Pdf/IZB/Vragenli-
jst%20Vogelgriep%20Onderzoek%20extra%20 met-
ing%20aug06.pdf.
We also asked how much information people had
received about AI (ranging from nothing to very much),
and assessed knowledge of AI based upon four questions.
First of all 'The avian influenza virus can be transmitted
from human to human' (false). Secondly 'There is a vac-
cine that protects humans against infection with the
avian influenza virus' (false). Thirdly 'In the Netherlands
in 2006 people have died as a result of an infection with
the avian influenza virus' (false) and finally 'By eating
chicken or poultry someone can become infected with
the avian influenza virus' (false). The right answers were
those answers that were in line with the public informa-
tion in the Netherlands at the time of the surveys. The
questionnaire included a question on whether the
respondent was vaccinated against influenza in the last
year and whether he or she kept chicken or poultry.
Mean scores and 95% confidence intervals were calcu-
lated for the perceived severity, vulnerability and compar-
ative vulnerability of several diseases and conditions.
Differences in background characteristics (gender and
level of education) between the surveys were explored
with Chi-square tests. Level of education was divided in
three categories: lower education (primary school, lower
general secondary school, lower vocational school, or
less), intermediate level education (high school or
medium level vocational school), or higher education
(university or college degree). Differences in age and
mean scores between surveys were tested pair wise, tak-
ing multiple testing into account, with the Bonferroni
post-hoc test in Univariate Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA). Time trends were analyzed with linear regres-
sion analyses with perceived severity, perceived vulnera-
bility, amount of information, knowledge and the
different preventive measures as dependent variables and
time (the survey) as the main independent variable and
gender, age and level of education as covariates.
Univariate associations of several determinants with
perceived vulnerability were tested with ANOVA or T-
test. To study correlates of precautionary behaviour, a
new dichotomous variable 'precautionary measures' was
defined and coded 1 (yes), if respondents had taken any of
the specific measures, and coded 0 (no) if respondents
had done nothing. Univariate logistic regression analyses
were performed, with self reported characteristics as
independent variables and taking precautionary mea-
sures as the dependent variable. For the odds ratios, 95%
confidence intervals (CI) were calculated. Variables
showing an association of p < 0.1 were included in the
multivariate analysis. Variables were included blockwise,
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the first step, severity and vulnerability were added in the
second step, self efficacy in the third step, and knowledge,
amount of information received and thinking about AI in
the fourth step. All first order interactions between the
variables added after the first step were assessed. The
final model was run after excluding variables with an
association of p > 0.1.
Results
In total 3,840 respondents participated in the seven sur-
veys; per survey the number of participants varied
between 467 and 650. Overall response was 64% and var-
ied between 55% and 77% (see Table 1). In all but one, (i.e.
the August 2006 survey) the majority of respondents
were women, in total 54%. Compared to the general
Dutch population, where 51% is female, women are
slightly overrepresented in our surveys. The proportion
of women in the first 4 surveys was lower compared to
the last 3 surveys (51% vs. 58%, χ2 (df ) = 16.5 [1]; p <
0.001) (Table 1). Mean age was 45 years (range 18-86, SD
14.8), with respondents in survey 1 being significantly
younger (41.3) than respondents in the other surveys
(46.0), (F(df ) = 51.0[1]; p < 0.001). Compared to the gen-
eral Dutch population, people aged 45-59 years were
somewhat overrepresented in the survey (31% versus
27%), and people aged 60 years and older underrepre-
sented (20% versus 24%). Over all surveys, 26%, 39% and
35% of respondents had received lower, intermediate and
higher education respectively. This distribution is 27%,
44%, and 29% in the general population, which shows
overrepresentation of participants with high educational
level and underrepresentation of those with intermediate
educational level. 11% of the participants were of non-
Dutch origin and 23% had been vaccinated against influ-
enza. Children under 12 years lived in 22% of the house-
holds. Only 4% kept chicken or poultry at home.
Infection with AI was perceived as a (very) severe
health problem by 91.8% of the study population with a
mean score of 4.57 (95% CI 4.55 - 4.60; scale 1 - 5); 0.7%
reported (very) high perceived vulnerability, mean = 1.69
(95% CI 1.66 - 1.71, scale 1 - 5) (see Table 2). Comparative
vulnerability for AI was 2.59 (95% CI 2.56 - 2.61, scale 1 -
Table 1: Participation rates and distribution of general characteristics in the study population.
N %
Invited 5995
Participants, response 3841 64%
Gender
Male 1765 46%
Female 2046 54%
Age (mean) 45.3
Education*
Low 1000 26%
Intermediate 1479 39%
High 1332 35%
Children <12 in household
Yes 845 22%
No 2966 78%
Ethnicity
Dutch 3398 89%
Non-Dutch 413 11%
Vaccinated against influenza
Yes 887 23%
No 2909 76%
Keeping chicken or poultry
Yes 137 4%
No 3674 96%
* Educational level is defined as: low: primary school, lower general secondary school, lower vocational school, or less; intermediate: high 
school or medium level vocational school; high: college or university degree.
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same age and gender). Compared with other diseases,
getting infected with AI was perceived as very serious
with a score of 4.57 on a scale from 0-5 (see Table 2). Only
HIV, 4.92 (95% CI 4.91 - 4.93), and heart disease, 4.82
(95% CI 4.80 - 4.83), had a significantly higher perceived
severity. Perceived severity of other diseases and condi-
tions varied from 4.18 (95% CI 4.16 - 4.21) to 1.87 (95% CI
1.85 - 1.89) for a common cold. In contrast perceived vul-
nerability for common cold was the highest with 3.64
(95% CI 3.61 - 3.67), while for HIV it was the lowest at
1.23 (95% CI 1.21 - 1.24). Comparative vulnerability of
HIV was also low at 1.88 (95% CI 1.85 - 1.91), while for a
common cold it was 3.07 (95% CI 3.05 - 3.09).
All four knowledge questions were answered correctly
by 10.2% of the respondents; 16.5% had all answers
wrong. The mean score for knowledge was 1.87 (95% CI
1.83 - 1.91, scale 0-4). Of all respondents 49% reported to
have received a reasonable amount of information about
AI and 7% (very) much, with a mean score for informa-
tion received of 2.63 (95% CI 2.61 - 2.65, scale 1 - 5); 3% of
respondents thought often or always about AI and 30%
sometimes, resulting in a mean score of 2.19 (95% CI 2.17
- 2.22). 33% of respondents were not sure that they could
do anything to prevent themselves from getting infected
with AI, while 20% felt reasonably sure or very sure. The
mean score for self efficacy was 2.23 (95% CI 2.20 - 2.27)
Almost half of the respondents (46%) reported taking
one or more preventive measures, with 36% reporting to
have stayed away from (wild) birds or poultry, 26% not
going to areas where AI was present and 2% buying anti-
viral drugs (see Table 3). 54% of respondents did not take
any measures, 13% took one measure, 14% took two mea-
sures, 10% took three and another 10% took four or more
measures.
In the regression analyses, time was not significantly
associated with perceived severity (β = -0.002, p = 0.772)
and for perceived vulnerability the regression coefficient
of time was just short of being statistically significant (β =
-0.011, p = 0.08). Time was significantly associated with
amount of information received (β = -0.065, p < 0.001),
knowledge (β = -0.127, p < 0.001) and taking preventive
measures (Table 3). In the pairwise comparisons, some
more significant differences in variables of interest were
found between different surveys. Perceived severity was
stable over the seven surveys, ranging between 90%
(August 2006) and 94% (March 2007). Perceived vulnera-
bility decreased slightly between March 2006, when 2%
perceived a (very) large chance of getting infected the
coming year, and September and December 2006, with
0.4% and 0.4% respectively (ANOVA September and
December 2006 vs. March 2006 p = 0.005 and p = 0.040
respectively). Perceived vulnerability was increased in
February 2007 compared to September 2006 (ANOVA p
= 0.04) (Figure 1). There was a significant decrease in the
amount of information received about AI, from 2.88 in
March 2006 to 2.47 in March 2007, in March 2006 14%
had received (very) much information, in March 2007
this had decreased to 5% (Figure 2). Knowledge about AI
also showed a significant decrease from 2.33 in March
2006 to 1.51 in March 2007, with in March 2006 43% of
respondents answering three or four questions correct
while in March 2007 this was 22%. The level of knowl-
edge was positively associated with the amount of infor-
mation received (Pearson r = 0.24, p < 0.001).
There was a significant increase in the percentage of
respondents who had taken preventive measures between
March and June 2006 from 38% to 50% (χ2 (df ) = 18.4 [1],
p < 0.001), while there was no difference among the sec-
ond until the last survey, ranging from 50% in the second
survey to 43% in the fourth survey (χ2 (df ) = 8.2 [5], p =
Table 2: Perceived severity, vulnerability and comparative vulnerability (mean and 95% CI).
Severity Vulnerability Comparative vulnerability
Mean (95% CI) Mean (95% CI) Mean (95% CI)
HIV 4.92 (4.91 - 4.93) 1.23 (1.21 - 1.24) 1.88 (1.85 - 1.91)
Heart attack 4.82 (4.80 - 4.83) 2.26 (2.23 - 2.29) 2.82 (2.80 - 2.85)
Avian influenza 4,57 (4.50 - 4.60) 1.69 (1.66 - 1.71) 2.59 (2.56 - 2.61)
Tuberculosis 4.49 (4.47 - 4.51) 1.68 (1.65 - 1.70) 2.50 (2.47 - 2.52)
Diabetes 4.18 (4.16 - 4.21) 2.11 (2.08 - 2.14) 2.85 (2.82 - 2.87)
High blood pressure 3.60 (3.57 - 3.62) 2.44 (2.41 - 2.47) 2.84 (2.82 - 2.87)
Food poisoning 3.59 (3.57 - 3.62) 2.38 (2.36 - 2.41) 2.73 (2.71 - 2.75)
Common cold 1.87 (1.85 - 1.89) 3.64 (3.61 - 3.67) 3.07 (3.05 - 3.09)
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reported most often, by 36% of respondents (ranging
between 33% in September 2006 and 39% in August
2006). For the specific preventive actions, an increase
over time was observed for not going to areas with AI
Table 3: Proportion of respondents that took preventive measures, overall and by measurement.
Mar '06 June '06 Aug '06* Sept 06 Dec 06 Feb 07* Mar 0 Overall β-value+ Beta§ p-value#
Took preventive measures 38% 50% 49% 43% 45% 48% 49% 46% 0.008 0.032 0.042
Not getting in touch with (wild) 
birds or poultry
31% 39% 39% 33% 34% 38% 38% 36% 0.005 0.022 0.175
Not going to areas with AI 18% 25% 28% 23% 27% 33% 31% 26% 0.018 0.081 0.000
Paying more attention to 
hygiene
9% 16% 17% 16% 14% 16% 18% 15% 0.008 0.042 0.003
Eating less or no chicken or 
poultry
9% 12% 11% 9% 14% 12% 12% 11% 0.004 0.022 0.175
Cancelled or didn't book a 
holiday to an area with AI
7% 9% 9% 6% 9% 11% 11% 9% 0.006 0.039 0.016
Getting oneself vaccinated 
against influenza
2% 6% 5% 6% 8% 4% 6% 5% 0.004 0.032 0.044
Keeping the cat indoors 5% 5% 4% 3% 4% 6% 6% 5% 0.001 0.013 0.428
Avoid gatherings of people 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 0.003 0.036 0.024
Buying antiviral drugs 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 4% 2% 0.002 0.034 0.036
Buying a mouth mask 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 3% 2% 0.003 0.045 0.005
Something else 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 2% 2% 2% 0.000 0.001 0.975
Avoiding shaking hands 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 0.000 0.000 0.980
* additional surveys
+ β-value: regression coefficient of time variable as a correlate of the independent variables, adjusted for gender, age and level of education
§ Beta: standardised regression coefficient
# p-value of the standardised regression coefficient from the linear regression analyses
Figure 1 Mean severity and vulnerability for AI with 95% confi-
dence intervals. * additional surveys
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Page 8 of 15(March 2006 18%, February 2007 33%), paying more
attention to hygiene (9% March 2006, 18% in March
2007), cancelled or did not book a holiday to an area with
AI (6% in September 2006, 11% in March 2007), getting
oneself vaccinated against influenza (2% March 2006, 8%
December 2006), avoiding gatherings of people (2%
March 2006, 4% March 2007), buying antiviral drugs (1%
March 2006, 4% March 2007), and buying a mouth mask
(1% March 2006, 3% March 2007) (Table 3; Figure 3). No
differences in risk perceptions, precautionary actions or
information received were observed related to the spe-
cific events (August 2006 and February 2007) when com-
pared to the previous and consecutive surveys.
Most demographic factors and knowledge and infor-
mation determinants were significantly associated with
perceived vulnerability (Table 4). Perceived vulnerability
was higher for women, for elder respondents, for respon-
dents without children below 12, for those with a lower
education, for those who thought more about AI, for
those with a lower level of knowledge and for those vacci-
nated against influenza. Ethnicity and amount of infor-
mation were not significantly associated with perceived
vulnerability.
In univariate logistic analysis of precautionary behav-
iour as the dependent (outcome) variable, the demo-
graphic variables, the specific surveys and variables from
the Protection Motivation Theory were included as inde-
pendent variables (Table 5). Of the demographic variables
all, apart from gender and keeping chicken or poultry,
were significantly associated with precautionary behav-
iour. Respondents with a higher age, a lower education,
without children below 12, of non-Dutch ethnicity, and
those who had been vaccinated against influenza were
more likely to take preventive measures. Furthermore
preventive measures were taken more often by those
respondents who considered AI very severe, who had a
higher perceived vulnerability, who had a higher self effi-
cacy, who had less knowledge, who had received more
information about AI and thought more about AI. Com-
pared to the first survey, respondents in the subsequent
surveys reported to have taken precautionary measures
more often.
Figure 3 Proportion of respondents that took preventive measures, overall and by measurement. * Additional surveys
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Table 4: Determinants of vulnerability for avian influenza.
mean p-value
Gender 0,019
Male 1,66
Female 1,72
Agegroup 0,002
18-29 1,66
30-44 1,63
45-59 1,73
60 + 1,75
Children <12 in household 0,024
Yes 1,64
No 1,71
Ethnicity 0,256
Dutch 1,68
Non-Dutch 1,73
Education* <0.001
Low 1,84
Intermediate 1,65
High 1,62
Think flu <0.001
Never 1,46
Rarely 1,62
Sometimes 1,88
Often/All the time 2,19
Knowledge score <0.001
0 1,80
1 1,73
2 1,72
3 1,60
4 1,53
Amount of info 0,886
Nothing/Little 1,69
Some 1,68
(very) much 1,67
Vaccinated against influenza 0,001
Yes 1,77
No 1,67
* Educational level is defined as: low: primary school, lower general secondary school, lower vocational school, or less; intermediate: high 
school or medium level vocational school; high: college or university degree.
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Page 10 of 15Table 5: Proportions of respondents that reported to have taken any preventive measures and results from logistics 
regressions analyses (Odds ratio (OR and 95% confidence intervals (95%CI)) exploring correlates of preventive measures.
univariate multivariate
n N % OR 95% CI p-value OR 95% CI p-value
Overall 1750 3811 45,9%
Survey <0,001 <0,001
1 218 579 37,7% 1,0 1,0
2 272 540 50,4% 1,7 1,3 2,1 1,8 1,4 2,4
3 314 644 48,8% 1,6 1,3 2,0 1,6 1,3 2,1
4 230 535 43,0% 1,2 1,0 1,6 1,4 1,1 1,9
5 248 549 45,2% 1,4 1,1 1,7 1,5 1,2 2,0
6 224 463 48,4% 1,6 1,2 2,0 1,7 1,3 2,3
7 244 501 48,7% 1,6 1,2 2,0 1,9 1,5 2,5
Gender 0,493
Male 821 1765 46,5% 1,0
Female 929 2046 45,4% 1,0 0,8 1,1
Age group <0,001 <0,001
18-29 222 690 32,2% 1,0 1,0
30-44 478 1178 40,6% 1,4 1,2 1,8 1,4 1,1 1,7
45-59 581 1187 48,9% 2,0 1,7 2,5 1,8 1,5 2,2
60 + 469 756 62,0% 3,4 2,8 4,3 2,9 2,2 3,7
Education <0,001 0,002
Low 538 1000 53,8% 1,0 1,0
Intermediate 659 1479 44,6% 0,7 0,6 0,8 0,9 0,7 1,1
High 553 1332 41,5% 0,6 0,5 0,7 0,7 0,6 0,9
Children <12 in household 0,071
No 1385 2966 46,7% 1,0
Yes 365 845 43,2% 0,9 0,7 1,0
Ethnicity 0,070 0,078
Dutch 1543 3398 45,4% 1,0 1,0
Non-Dutch 207 413 50,1% 1,2 1,0 1,5 1,2 1,0 1,5
Vaccinated against influenza <0,001 0,010
Yes 506 887 57,0% 1,0 1,0
No 1240 2909 42,6% 0,6 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,7 0,9
Keeping chicken or poultry 0,715
No 1685 3674 45,9% 1,0
Yes 65 137 47,4% 1,1 0,8 1,5
Severity <0,001 <0,001
(Not) serious [1-4] 485 1256 38,6% 1,0 1,0
Very serious [5] 1265 2555 49,5% 1,6 1,4 1,8 1,5 1,3 1,7
Vulnerability <0,001 <0,001
Very small [1] 839 1984 42,3% 1,0 1,0
> Very small [2-5] 911 1827 49,9% 1,4 1,2 1,5 1,3 1,1 1,5
Self efficacy <0,001
Not confident [1] 482 1273 37,9% 1,0
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Page 11 of 15> Not confident [2-5] 1268 2538 50,0% 1,6 1,4 1,9
Self efficacy when never/rarely thinking of flu <0,001 <0,001
Not confident [1] 251 815 30,8% 1,0 1,0
> Not confident [2-5] 796 1738 45,8% 1,9 1,6 2,3 2,3 1,9 2,7
Self efficacy when sometimes- all the time thinking of flu <0,001 0,001
Not confident [1] 231 458 50,4% 1,0 1,0
> Not confident [2-5] 472 800 59,0% 1,4 1,1 1,8 1,5 1,2 1,9
Knowlegde score <0,001 0,001
0-1 732 1496 48,9% 1,0 1,0
2 514 1094 47,0% 0,9 0,8 1,1 0,9 0,8 1,1
3-4 504 1221 41,3% 0,7 0,6 0,9 0,7 0,6 0,9
Amount of info <0,001 <0,001
Nothing/little [1,2] 695 1691 41,1% 1,0 1,0
Some - very much [3-5] 1055 2120 49,8% 1,4 1,2 1,6 1,3 1,1 1,5
Thinking of flu <0,001 <0,001
Never/rarely [1,2] 1047 2553 41,0% 1,0 1,0
Sometimes - all the time [2-5] 703 1258 55,9% 1,8 1,6 2,1 2,2 1,7 2,9
Table 5: Proportions of respondents that reported to have taken any preventive measures and results from logistics 
regressions analyses (Odds ratio (OR and 95% confidence intervals (95%CI)) exploring correlates of preventive measures. 
(Continued)
The results of the multivariate logistic regression analy- it less likely that they would get infected with AI com-
sis are also shown in Table 5. As the odds ratio's of vari-
ables already in the model did not change substantially
after inclusion of variables in subsequent steps we pres-
ent the full model. The only statistically significant inter-
action term in the model was between self efficacy and
thinking about AI. In the final model the time of the sur-
vey, a higher age, a lower level of education, a non-Dutch
ethnicity, being vaccinated against influenza, a higher
perceived severity, a higher perceived vulnerability, a
higher self efficacy, a lower level of knowledge, more
information about AI, and thinking more about AI were
all associated with taking preventive measures. Self effi-
cacy was a stronger predictor of precautionary behaviour
for those who never or seldom think about AI (OR 2.3;
95% CI 1.9 - 2.7), compared to those who think about AI
more often (OR 1.5; 95% CI 1.2 - 1.9). The discriminative
value of the final model, expressed as the area under the
curve (AUC) with 95% confidence limits is 0.69 (0.67-
0.71).
Discussion
The results of our study indicate that perceived severity
of human infection with AI was and remained high; per-
ceived vulnerability was low compared to diseases such as
high blood pressure and a common cold. Perceived vul-
nerability decreased slightly during a one-year period
covering part of 2006 and 2007. Comparative vulnerabil-
ity was also relatively low indicating that people perceived
pared to others, which may be an indication of an opti-
mistic bias. The amount of information received and the
level of knowledge during the same period also
decreased. Substantial groups reported taking one or
more preventive measures with staying away from wild
birds and poultry remaining high throughout the period.
Our results further indicate that older people, women,
people without younger children, those with a lower edu-
cation, who thought more about AI, with a lower level of
knowledge about AI, and who were vaccinated against
influenza perceived their vulnerability for AI as higher.
Furthermore, respondents who were older, lower edu-
cated, of non-Dutch ethnicity, vaccinated against influ-
enza, had higher risk perceptions or self efficacy, less
knowledge, had received more information about AI, and
thought more often about AI, were more likely to report
engagement in precautionary actions.
A number of Asian studies looked into risk perception
of SARS over time. Lau and colleagues studied risk per-
ception of SARS in Hong Kong during the outbreak with
ten rounds of surveys and showed changes in both risk
perception and precautionary behaviour [34]. They
showed that perceived susceptibility declined in the sec-
ond phase of the epidemic, after April 8, 2003 as the num-
ber of new infections also declined. During the initial
phase of the epidemic with rising figures of new cases
there was a sharp increase in preventive measures.
Engagement in preventive measures remained on a high
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Page 12 of 15level, also after the epidemic started declining and per-
ceived susceptibility also declined. Leung and colleagues
also studied SARS in Hong Kong with six surveys and
showed a decrease in anxiety over time after the peak of
the SARS epidemic [36]. They also showed an increase in
the number of preventive measures at the start of the epi-
demic, which remained stable during the epidemic, and
this decreased sharply six months after the epidemic.
A number of studies have explored risk perception of
AI or an influenza pandemic and future preventive
behaviours. A Norwegian study showed that most people
regarded an influenza pandemic as a serious health issue,
although almost half of them underestimated the
expected mortality compared to the official estimations
[37]. 80% of respondents reported that they would be
careful about personal hygiene, while 11% reported to
stay home and avoid contact with others. Gupta and col-
leagues in a street-based survey in London concluded
that 71% of their respondents thought an influenza pan-
demic (very) likely in the coming ten years, and almost all
respondents reported that they would wash their hands
more than five times per day if requested [38]. Fielding
studied risk perception of AI in relation to live chicken
sales and reported that 36% considered touching chicken
while buying them as risky [39].
Lau and colleagues carried out three studies in Hong
Kong on different aspects of human AI and human-to-
human transmission of AI [31,40,41]. In a first study sub-
stantial unconfirmed beliefs and misconceptions were
reported related to AI which were correlated to immedi-
ate behavioural responses, such as avoiding visits to hos-
pitals and eating less poultry [40]. A second study
indicated that if human-to-human transmission would
occur in Hong Kong, large proportions of respondents
would wear face masks in public venues (74%), increase
the frequency of hand washing (87%) or avoid eating
poultry (64%) [31]. The results of the third study showed
that between 71 and 81% of respondents reported to
avoid visiting hospitals, crowds, going out or going
abroad when there was either bird-to-human transmis-
sion or human-to-human transmission [41].
The high level of perceived severity of AI in our study is
in line with earlier studies that were conducted in Nor-
way, the UK and Hong Kong [31,37,38]. In our own ear-
lier international comparative study perceived severity
for AI in the Netherlands was also high [42]. As in other
studies women, the elderly and those with a lower educa-
tion have a higher perceived vulnerability [19,43]. Many
of the determinants we identified in this study are in line
with the studies of Lau and colleagues conducted in Hong
Kong although they focused on human-to-human trans-
mission of AI [31,41]. Of the common demographic vari-
ables (gender and age), in these studies older respondents
also reported higher intentions to take preventive mea-
sures. In their studies anticipated preventive behaviour
when human-to-human transmission would occur was
also related to a higher perceived susceptibility to H5N1
infection for oneself or one's family, which is in line with
our findings on perceived vulnerability.
While perceived severity remained stable and perceived
vulnerability decreased slightly, there was a stronger
decrease in the amount of information received and
related decrease in knowledge. The level of knowledge
was positively associated with the amount of information
received (Pearson r = 0.24, p < 0.001). This relation may
be associated with the decrease in media attention to
avian influenza during this period. An inventory of atten-
tion for AI and an influenza pandemic in two of the main
national newspapers, Algemeen Dagblad and NRC Han-
delsblad showed this decrease. While in 2006 from
March until December these newspapers published 150
and 107 articles respectively, this number decreased in
2007 to 74 and 55 respectively, and to 8 and 6 in the first
three months of 2008.
There was, however, no significant effect on either per-
ceived severity, perceived vulnerability, nor on the
amount of information or knowledge of the two episodes:
the suspicion of AI among owls in the Rotterdam zoo and
the outbreak among poultry in the UK leading to new
requirements to keep birds under cover. During the SARS
outbreak in Hong Kong changes in risk perception where
shown to be related to the course of the outbreak [34,36],
whereas even the introduction of AI in Europe did not
appear to lead to a change in risk perception [42]. This
might indicate that only a true outbreak of an emerging
infectious disease and changes in its course will lead to
changes in risk perception.
The stable high level of preventive measures is in line
with the earlier studies on SARS in Hong Kong where
these measures remained high during the epidemic and,
as Leung showed, only decreased after the epidemic
ended [36]. More research, however, is needed to estab-
lish in more detail how changes in the course of out-
breaks in and outside the country and media coverage are
related to risk perceptions and preventive behaviour.
Our study makes clear that AI is seen as a serious but
rare disease, similar to such infectious diseases as tuber-
culosis and HIV. These diseases are rare among the gen-
eral population in the Netherlands, leading to high
perceived severity but lower perceived vulnerability
[44,45]. HIV and tuberculosis can be considered diseases
with high prevalence in specific population groups, lead-
ing to low comparative vulnerability in the general popu-
lation: for the population at large such diseases, especially
HIV, are perceived as a threat to 'others'. A similar low
comparative vulnerability as for tuberculosis was
observed for AI.
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between thinking about AI and knowledge about AI in
relation to perceived vulnerability. While more 'actual'
knowledge about the disease is associated with lower per-
ceived vulnerability, thinking more often about AI corre-
lates with a higher perceived vulnerability. 'Thinking
about' AI may be a proxy for worry about the disease.
Worry can be related to both risk perception and preven-
tive behaviours [25,46]. Lau and colleagues also found
that worry about oneself or family members contracting
the virus was associated with anticipated preventive
behaviour [31]. The interaction effect between thinking
about AI and self efficacy also underlines that thinking
about AI, or worry, warrants separate attention.
The present study is unique in that we included self-
reported preventive behaviours related to AI rather than
only intentions or plans. Our findings confirm that next
to demographic variables perceived severity, perceived
vulnerability, amount of information, thinking about AI
and self efficacy are significantly associated with precau-
tionary behaviour. The fact that less knowledge was
related to taking preventive measures more often asks for
more detailed research into the relation between knowl-
edge and preventive behaviours. It might be that in this
case - because there were no cases of avian influenza in
the Netherlands - that those with more specific knowl-
edge considered preventive measures less necessary.
If additional research suggests that these relations are
causal, it may inform public health interventions, because
these determinants can be influenced by communication
strategies, which is of great importance for non-pharma-
ceutical intervention strategies during outbreaks or a
pandemic. Evidently, risk perceptions in terms of proba-
bility and severity is only one of many potential determi-
nants of precautionary behaviours. A realistic perception
of risk is, however, recognised in key behaviour change
theories as a crucial step towards protection motivation
[15,47,48]. The moderate discriminative value (AUC =
0.69) of the multivariate model describing factors associ-
ated with precautionary behaviour however suggests that
other, unmeasured factors may be of additional impor-
tance.
Our study has several limitations. Firstly we used an
Internet based panel, which may have led to an overrep-
resentation of those who are computer literate. The
panel, however, is representative for the Dutch popula-
tion in terms of age, gender and level of education. The
percentage of people being vaccinated against influenza
in our study (23%) is somewhat higher than what has
been reported for the general Dutch population (18,1%)
[45] The fact that we used a research panel of which par-
ticipants in the present study received a very small reim-
bursement for completing surveys (i.e. Euro 1,50 per
survey), may have resulted in a study population that is
somewhat more interested in participating in research
surveys. However, using such a panel for this series of
surveys has also most probably resulted in higher
response rates than if we used sample from the general
population.
A second limitation is that in our question about pre-
cautionary behaviour we did not specify when the
respondents engaged in such behaviour. This may have
resulted in over-reporting of preventive measures espe-
cially in the latter surveys. A third limitation was that we
considered those answers to the knowledge questions
right which were in line with the general public informa-
tion, however, during the times of the surveys there was
some scientific evidence about isolated non-sustained
human-to-human transmission. This might have led to
some people answering this question differently. Finally,
we used a questionnaire that has not been validated in
other studies, although it has been based on earlier stud-
ies related to risk perception of SARS, AI and other
(infectious) diseases [33,42].
Conclusions
Our study has several implications for public health pol-
icy and research. The results of this study support the
validity of the Protection Motivation Theory for investi-
gations of potential determinants of precautionary behav-
iours for emerging infectious diseases. The fact that
perceived severity of AI appears to be high offers a good
point of departure for more specific risk communications
to promote precautionary actions if needed. The stability
of the level of risk perception indicates that it is not seen
as a temporary problem. Knowledge however, decreased
over time indicating the need to keep the public continu-
ally well informed, especially about which measures will
be effective, since a substantial number of respondents
took non-effective measures. In the current H1N1 pan-
demic this underlines the necessity to inform the general
public about the specific features of the pandemic as well
as preventive measures. The stability of the levels of risk
perception gives credibility to cross-sectional one-time
surveys of risk perception.
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